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A. 
The Committee on External Economic Relations hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with 
explanatory statement: 
Motion for a Resolution 
on the delineation and further development of GATT and of the free trade 
principle underlying the GATT system and possible consequences for the EEC and 
GATT 
The European Parliament, 
has, in formulating the proposals outlined below, been guided by the following 
considerations: 
A. the European Community earns about 25X of its gross national product from 
exports, with half of this figure coming from exports to non-Community 
member states. The maintenance and further development of free world 
trade is thus of decisive importance for the evolution of the European 
Community and for the preservation and creation of jobs, 
B. none of the countries of the European Community are currently able to 
solve their economic problems by themselves. They have to rely on each 
other and will only succeed in overcoming their economic problems to the 
extent that they are successful in developing common interests and placing 
these before individual national considerations, 
C. the basis of the European Community's trade policy is Articles 110- 116 
of the EEC Treaty which call on the Member States to contribute to 'the 
harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international trade and the Lowering of custom barriers' 
and which state that 'Member States shall, in respect of all matters of 
particular interest to the common market, proceed within the framework of 
international organizations of an economic character only by common 
action', 
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D. the valuable role played by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 
the development and growth of world trade and the vital contribution of 
the European Community in bringing about successive rounds of trade 
liberalization measures, 
E. also the role of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development and its potential for coordinating the economic policies of 
the major industrialized democracies, 
F. commitment to free world trade and rejection of all forms of 
protectionism are not enough in themselves to influence world trade in 
such a way that the differing economic conditions in the industrial and 
developing countries are taken into account, while allowing, as far as 
possible, its free and unrestricted development, 
G. free trade based on fair competition which respects the principles of the 
social market economy must be regarded as a fundamental principle of the 
world economy. This principle will permit measures, in conformity with 
the rules of GATT, designed to organize and regulate free trade, such as 
duties, quotas and adjustment or transitional aids, 
H. differing economic conditions will inevitably reflect themselves in 
varying degrees of adherence by countries to a free trade system, but the 
free and unrestricted development of the world economy should be the 
overriding goal of international economic policy. Impermissible 
protectionism must be clearly distinguished from measures to influence or 
regulate world trade which are motivated by current or future political, 
economic or social needs, and are clearly recognized under GATT rules, 
I. an effective free trade policy needs to be backed up by a Community 
industrial policy in order to maximize the positive impact it has in 
strengthening the internal market and thus stimulating productivity and 
improving the employment situation in Europe. It is essential to develop 
a forward-looking structural policy in order, on the one hand, 
successfully to develop and export new technologies while on the other, 
bringing about the rapid restructuring of industries which are at present 
in a state of crisis or threatened with adverse conditions in future; 
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K. structural change and economic growth, the safeguarding and creation of 
jobs on the one hand, and external trade on the other, are closely 
interlinked in the Community as a result of the high Level of 
international economic interpenetration, 
L. changes in the structure of production and employment are influenced by 
changes in the level and structure of world demand, 
M. GATT has proved its worth and must be further developed as the basis of 
the free world trade. The negotiations conducted over the Last few years 
within the framework of GATT have succeeded in bringing about a 
Liberalization of trade without, however, providing solutions for 
important problems such as the need to satisfy the Legitimate demands of 
the developing countries as regards their position in world trade. 
Moreover, the current crisis places GATT very much at risk, as the Geneva 
GATT Conference in November 1982 clearly demonstrated; 
N. a considerable proportion of international trade is dominated by 
multinational companies which often manage to avoid effective state or 
Community control, 
0. in this connection, Parliament also refers to the following reports on 
'The impact of the CAP on the external relations of the European 
Community' 
(Sir Fred Catherwood -Doc. 1-248/83) 
'EEC-US trade relations in the steel sector' 
<Mr Spencer - PE 80.268/rev.>, 
and 
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- its resolution of 16 November 1982 on the GATT Ministerial 
Conference(1), 
- its·resolution of 13 October 1981 on enterprises and governments in 
international economic activity(2), 
- the report drawn up by the Committee on External Economic Relations 
(Doc. 1-493/83), 
Having regard to these considerations, the European Paliament resolves as 
follows: 
1(a) The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has proved an extremely 
valuable international institution, and must now be developed and 
strengthened at a time of recession and declining world trade. It should 
be noted that the GATT system was established at a time of currency 
stability and that the principles of free trade which it enshrines are 
dependant on a coherent framework of currency values that truly reflect 
purchasing power parities. 
(b) The essential aims of any further development of GATT should be to 
safeguard and promote measures: 
(i) to open up market opportunities throughout the industrialized and 
developing world, and restore growth in world trade; 
(ii) to support an effective world division of Labour based on the 
concept of optimising the allocation of resources by free and fair 
exchange, in accordance with the principles of comparative 
advantage; 
(1) OJ C 334, 20.12.1982, p. 25 ff 
{2) OJ C 287, 9.11.1981, p. 25 ff 
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(iii) to facilitate the economic development of poorer countries by 
encouraging free access to world markets; 
,I 
Civ> to ease the structural adjustment of economies in order to maximize 
employment and growth; 
(v) to provide for the employment and welfare of both workers and 
employers by improving the functioning of the open trading system; 
(c) This further development should also take account of the fact that GATT 
was designed to meet the needs of trade between countries with similar 
economic structures, and only gradually were special provisions 
introduced in favour of developing countries; 
(d) It should hence focus on the development of industry in the more advanced 
developing countries in particular and also on the creation of special 
structures geared exclusively or mainly to exports, as in Japan for 
example; 
2. The principles of non-discrimination, reciprocity of concessions and free 
access to markets should be maintained. Efforts to replace the 
principle of multilaterality with bilateral reciprocity (balancing the 
trade between individual trading partners) should be rejected; 
3. The developing countries should become subject to the GATT rules for free 
world trade as and when their industries have reached a competitive stage 
of development 
4. The further development of GATT must aim to remove non-tariff trade 
barriers by standardizing the technical and environmental specifications 
for products, since these affect manufacturing costs and hence 
competitiveness; 
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5. ~ew non-tariff measures having the effect of further restricting or 
distorting international trade should not be allowed. Existing trade 
barriers that have been approved by GATT should be systematically 
eliminated. An agreement simply requiring the registration of 
trade-restricting measures is inadequate as a first step. Monitori.ng of 
existing quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff trade barriers 
for compatibility with GATT rules is required; 
6. Precise criteria sho_uld be laid down for voluntary restraint agreements 
and quotas, together with selective recourse to the protective clauses, 
permitting them only for a certain period of time and under exceptional 
circumstances; 
7. Provision should be made for the establishment of a special GATT 
committee for agriculture to examine the growing problems in 
international agricultural trade, including the problems connected with 
tropical products; 
8. Steps should be taken to prepare a study on the importance of trade in 
textiles and clothing, the impact of existing restrictions under the 
world textile agreement, and the impact of the expiry of the current 
restrictive measures; 
9. Subsidies must be defined more precisely in GATT, with a clear 
distinction to be drawn between subsidies to ease the transition and 
adjustment to changed structures and subsidies designed to preserve 
structures and admissible under GATT rules; 
10. Trade in services should be brought under the GATT rules; 
11. An improved procedure for settling disputes should be devised to ensure 
that the parties involved in a dispute reach an amicable settlement. 
Where an amicable settlement cannot be achieved, the GATT Council and the 
Director-General of GATT should have greater powers to mediate. In 
addition, the disciplinary measures provided for by GATT to deal with 
violations of the agreement should be improved and strengthened to ensure 
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that members of GATT comply with its rules. The applicability of 
safeguard measures requires in particular a concrete definition of the 
concept of 'market disruption'; 
12. International economic cooperation and coordination of national economic 
and monetary policies should be further developed and extended with the 
aim of eliminating imbalances in the world economy and hence promoting 
growth, trade and employment. Within the OECD and GATT the Community 
must press for the coordination of economic policy aimed at the steady 
recovery of industrial production and international trade, and the 
reduction of unemployment. Monetary stability should be restored by a 
strengthening of the European Monetary System and greater cooperation 
with the other major trading currencies. Efforts should be made to 
arrange a separate GATT Round on the trade problems between the 
developing countries and the industrialized nations -and also among the 
developing countries themselves - in order to achieve greater access to 
markets, in particular those of the industrialized nations and the more 
advanced developing countries; 
13. Parliame~t should investigate the practicality of sending an ad hoc 
delegation to future GATT conferences as observers. This delegation 
would comprise members of the Committee on External Economic Relations 
and members of other committees whose terms of reference cover the 
subjects discussed at these conferences; 
14. The external trade of the European Community will be based on fair 
competition which respects the principles of the social market economy; 
15. The common European external trade policy must be strengthened. It must 
be compatible, at sectoral Level and in relation to the Community's 
partners in world trade, with the strategies to be developed in future 
for Community industries. National import and export regulations in the 
Member States should be replaced in the near future by common European 
Community regulations; 
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16. Developing country participation in world trade should, as far as the 
Community is concerned, mean respecting commitments entered into within 
the framework of the Lome Convention and the various cooperation 
agreements concluded with other countries, constant efforts in the 
appropriate forums of negotiations to meet the legitimate demands of 
these countries and constant efforts to help the poorest developing 
countries; 
17. Efforts should be made to limit the organization of free trade to 
tariffs, other levies and quantitative quotas for goods; these measures 
should be limited in tim~ and designed to restore competitive-
ness, allow structural adjustment or- if politically desirable -
maintain certain structures- e.g. the coal and shipbuilding industries-
without regard to competitiveness; 
18. Export subsidies, tax concessions designed to secure an unjustified 
competitive advantage and all forms of dumping are rejected as 
incompatible with GATT rules and steps should be taken under GATT to 
combat these violations; 
19. In addition to unilateral measures, bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements are also suitable for organizing free trade. These include 
the Generalized Preferences System, which, when further developed, may be 
expected to differentiate more significantly among the beneficiary states 
according to their state of development; 
20. In the Long term, a liberalization plan should be developed for world 
trade to replace the current practice of holding an annual review of 
tariff preferences within the framework of a 10-year basic programme. 
This plan should provide for a negotiated step-by-step reduction in 
tariffs and a staged reduction in quantitative restrictions, taking into 
account the economic conditions in the various countries concerned, in 
order to permit investment planning in the Long term and - when necessary 
-to allow differing periods of adjustment; 
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21. Although the inclusion of investment in GATT is extremely controversial 
among the contracting nations, it considers that studies on this subject 
would be useful, as they may contribute to transparency in, and promotion 
of, world trade; 
22. Contractual trade arrangements in the form of cooperation and association 
agreements with states and groups of states should be further developed 
to replace traditional trade agreements; 
23. The European Community must take over from the Member States a greater 
share of the responsibility for external trade than in the past, with the 
aim of preventing distortion of competition between the Member States and 
improving the negotiating position of the Community by coordinating 
external economic relations; 
24. Intra-Community trade barriers should be reduced further in order to 
increase the international competitiveness of the European Community. 
This will also enable the Community to cut its tariffs to third countries 
still further so as to secure in return a lowering of import barriers in 
those countries; 
25. The adjustments dictated by external economic relations should be made to 
conform to the Liberalization requirement of the EEC Treaty in order to 
put an end to the individual restrictive measures increasingly being 
taken by the Member States. Campaigns to promote the buying of national 
products and measures to identify the national origin of products should 
be counteracted; 
26. The Commission is asked to supplement the European Community's 
development policy with an industrial policy for the internal market and 
to coordinate these policies; 
27. The objectives of such an industrial policy will include the creation of 
a long-term international constructive division of labour and the 
establishment of international rules for such a division of labour and 
the concomitant structural adjustments in order to ensure that the social 
and economic consequences of free trade accord with the specified 
economic guidelines; 
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28. Such an industrial policy will include the following measures in 
particular: 
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the coordination of national structural policies with the aim of 
gradually replacing these with a common European structural policy, 
the observation and analysis of developments in the world economy, 
the supply of information to industry and the development of early, 
preventive adjustment strategies, 
the creation of the Legal bases required to improve and facilitate 
economic cooperation between European undertakings across national 
frontiers, 
the development of a set of instruments for small and medium-sized 
undertakings to help them improve their participation in external 
trade by securing new markets and cultivating existing markets, 
the coordination of the structural adjustment measures required, 
the focussing of these measures on transitional and adjustment aids 
and the Limiting of structure-preserving subsidies to short 
transitional periods, 
studies on special consideration for trade in high-technology 
products in an effort to bring about the dismantling of high tariff 
barriers in the long term; 
the promotion of innovation by creating a 'Community know-how 
exchange', procuring risk capital and developing a common approach 
to advanced and further training; 
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the laying down of binding measures at Community level <and in 
cooperation with other third countries if they so desire) to 
control and ensure the transparency of market channels between 
companies - multinationals and their subsidiaries in particular -
with regard to prices, re-importation and conditions of foreign 
investment, etc.; 
29. The President of the European Parliament is instructed to forward this 
resolution to the Council and the Commission. 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. Introduction 
1. Unobstructed European Community participation in world trade is of 
overwhelming importance, not only for the smooth running of economic activity 
and an impetus to its renewal, but also as a meant of securing jobs and 
creating new ones. European Connunity exports in l91U to third couhtries were 
worth $ 303.5 million (USA: $ 225.8 million ) and ita iaports from third 
countries were worth $ 338 million (US: $271.2 million) (1). 
2. World trade has been stagnating since the late 70s. The multiple reaaons 
for this include the increases in energy prices, toaether with milguided 
investment policies in n1any countries creating •n exceuive debt burden, with 
the conbl:!quence that the exports of these countries are devoted ...Ore or less 
in their entirety to debt repayments. Other factors include inflation and 
unemployment. The adverse effects of many of theae factors on world trade are 
tending to be mutually reinforced. The high debt burden induces many 
countries to restrict imports, thereby ultimately reducing exports, including 
tllo11e ot the~ Europelln Community. Energy pri.ces, having risen enoJ"IIIOusly aince 
thl' lat~ 1011, account tor a considernbly higher share of grou national 
product thnn before. This sh~tre is then no lonaer available for internal 
.· .. n···•nopll•"'• and th~ consen.ue1oct.· is n further rise in unemployment. Growina 
.,u,·mployment, howeV•! r, means reduced purchasing power and thus a fall in 
consumption and in imports, usually accompanied by hiaher public debt. 
3. These development!! ar~ leading many states to rely, regardless of the 
wider consequences, on more protectionism, i.e. on acting unilaterally to 
protect their own industry through subsidies, exchange-rate manipulations, 
import quotas, etc. 
'floe st! mea,;ures 11 rc i nlPnded to increase exports and reduce imports as a means 
nt solving domeatic JHohlema. 'l'hi~ often menna however that the problems are 
simply transferred tu other stat~i. 
This raises the question as to whether the principle of free trade underlyina 
the General AgreemP.nt on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) can be maintained in ita 
current fo~, or whether and to what extent, changes and restrictions should 
be implemt•nted to bring l:ATT into line with new developments in world trade(l). 
<I) Ag••nc<• Europ~: St•lected statistics No. 338, 22 November 1982 
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II. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (2) 
( 1) Objectives 
4. The objectives of GATT are clearly set out in the preamble to the 
statute. They include the raising of living standards, full employment with 
rising real incomes, securing world-wide supplies of resources. and growth of 
production and trade. 
The means of achieving these objectives include the fundamental abolition. 
free of discrimination, of tariffs and other obstacles to trade on the basis 
of reciprocity and mutual advantage. 
S. Liberalization of world trade has since registered considerable suecesaes 
with the abolition of tariffs and the granting of moBt-favoured-nation 
status. On average over thP. years l<.J48 to 19RO the volume of world trade grew 
by 7% per year. In the Dillon, Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds. tariffs were reduced 
so substantially as an international obstacle to trade that they now 
constitute no roore than a secondary problem. 
t.LJ •:unent problems and outstanding questions at the GATT ministerial 
conference of November 1982 
6. Although major progress ~n liberalizing world trade has been made under 
GATT, a number of £_b~t~cle~ E_o_t!a~e_remain. especially i;:, the ~o!!.-E_a!i!f 
area. These include the controversy over the fixing of customs value, or the 
approximation ot technical standards and abuses of protective measures and 
standards for imported products, such as health provisions, which have also 
assumed major importance within the European market. Impediments to free 
trade as set out in the GATT agreement also include distortions of 
competitivity through national aids, the authorization of export cartels. 
dumping practices and tax concessions to promote exports such as the DISC 
system in the USA. 
(1) At present 88 states are members of GATT; about 30 others apply its rules 
without being formal members. 
(2) Of 30 October 1947 - in force as from 1 January 1948 
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World trade nevertheless underwent an expansion that would scarcely have been 
imaginable at the end of the Second World War, and which is one of the main 
sources of economic development in Europe and of the prosperity of the peoples 
of the European Community. 
During the yea~& of eeonomic expansion and worldwide ~conomic growth, it was 
relatively easy to expand the GATT rules and their application to world 
trade. This became more difficult as soon as world economic growth began to 
slow down in the early 70s, on the occasion of rising energy prices. It 
nevertheless remains the case that despite many infringements of its 
provisions and much evasion of its rules, GATT continued to operate in the 
ensuing decade as a wide-ranging and valuable impetus to world trade for all 
concerned. 
7. The main problems at present for GATT, and for world trade in general, lie 
with the abovementioned non-tariff obstacles to trade, and with the growing 
numbers of !e!f=lim!t!t!o~ !g~e!ffi!n~s (orderly marketing agreements) and the 
associated cartel-style dividing up of the market, as for example in the 
textiles, steel and, more recently, electronics industry (video recorders) • 
• ~ur wi 11 it do any longer to postulate full employment as one of the 
objectives of GATT. Free trade must be shaped for the future in such a way 
that, especially in times of crisis, it enables the necessary ~n&oinl 
!t~u~t~r!l_a~j~s~m!n~s to take place in conditions that allow as many as jobs 
as possible to be retained and new ones created, thereby allowing due 
consideration to be given to the social side of the labour process. 
8. !h! !n!e~e!t! £f_t~e_d!v!l£pinl £O~n!r!e! and of the so-called threshold 
countries must also be taken more firmly into consideration in the further 
development of GATT. When GATT was founded its main objective was to bring 
order to the industrialized world's trade. The developing countries and their 
needs made little impact on the main political considerations of the time. 
In 1981 however these countries account for something like a quarter of the 
volume of world trade. The abolition of the colonial system placed many of 
these countries in the role of unilateral petitioners - a development 
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reflected in part IV of the GATT rreaty negotiated in 1965. This allowed the 
developing countries to take unilateral protective measures to promote trade 
·and development; it waR matched by the agreement of the industrialized 
countries to forego reciprocity in trade-policy concessions. The one-sidedness 
of this development, which grants the developing countries full rights under 
GATT, but subjects them to scarcely any commitments, is increasingly coming to 
be seen as an undifferentiated and unsatisfactory concept. The 1979 Tokyo 
Round therefore contained an element of counterbalance, inasmuch as it 
stipulated more differentiated and more favourable treatment, reciproci~y and 
increased participation by the developing countries in world trade. 
9. The generalized preferences scheme subsequently established by most 
industrialized countries on a fixed-period, selective basis in favour of the 
developing countries was given a retrospective legal basis in this GATT 
decision in that in this part of the special provisions for the developing 
countries the principle of most-favoured-nation status was specifically 
abolished. At the same time the developing countries declared their 
willingness to continue to participate in GATT with a renewed commitment to 
its rights and duties. 
:1 l, ... iurther development of GATT requires that progress with development 
must be made subject to GATT rules, the need of the developing countries for 
rapid and unimpeded development must also be recognized. 
The world trade system must also allow development in the Third World that is 
not oriented exclusively to the trading needs of the industrialized 
countries. The developing countries trade with each o~her needs to be 
encouraged by appropriate arrangements, and the developing countries must be 
enabled to process their raw materials themselves and export them as 
half-finished products in the context of a world division of labour. In this 
way the developing countries can create jobs and increased purchasing power on 
their internal markets, and at the same time raise the volume of their trade 
and also play a significant part in world trade as importers. 
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10. The problems outlined above were at the centre of the GATT ministerial 
conference of 24/29 November 1982 in Geneva, which failed to bring a solution 
any nearer. This applies in particular to the questions raised above in 
connection with the ~eye!o£i~g_c~u~t!i~s. 
11. Other unsolved problems include the selective application of the 
~afe&u!r~ £l!u!e under Article XIX of GATT. Although this article does not 
stipulate general application, i.e. against all other partners to the Treaty, 
this follows from the application by analogy of the GATT principle of 
most-favoured-nation treatment, which by definition excludes selectively 
favourable treatment. 
In practice, general application of this safeguard clause is extremely 
difficult, since 'market disturbances' caused by export measures could for 
example result from states that have renewed and redeveloped their industries 
and are therefore able to sell very cheaply on the world market. The European 
Community had thus already sought in the Tokyo Round to secure an agreement on 
the right to selective application of Article XIX. Agreement could not 
however be reached, for different industrialized countries were not prepared 
to accept a commitment to seek prior approval of the relevant GATT committee 
for selective safeguard measures, and also because the developing countries 
feared discrimination by the industrialized countries. In practice the 
majority of safeguard measures were arranged selectively and this will 
probably continue to be the case. It can hardly be expected that the 
industrial countries will forego the selective option, or. allow it to become 
dependent on the authorization of the relevant GATT committee, for it is only 
in this way that they can continue to protect their industrial structures 
against sudden 'export offensives' by individual threshold countries and bring 
about appropriate structural adjustments. 
12. A central problem is posed in particular by ~g!i£u!t~r~l_t!a~e and the 
question of subsidies in this area. Under the Tokyo Round an agreement was 
secured between countries exporting agricultural products whereby they would 
pursuant to Article XVI (3) of GATT, refrain from subsidizing exports in such 
a way as to secure more than a fair share of world trade in a particular 
product. 
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The USA and other exporters of agricultural products take the view thAt the 
European Community has infringed this Tokyo-Round agreement by granting 
inadmissible subsidies. The USA seeks completely free trade in agricultural 
products. The European Community however is not prepared to compromise the 
basic principles of its agricultural policy. The relative openness with which 
subsidies are made available for agriculture in the Community makes the policy 
vulnerable to criticism. The EEC takes the view, however, that many other 
countries, including traditional exporters of agricultural products, also 
subsidize their agriculture to a high degree, in some cases even more 
intensively than the Community, though often by less transparent means. No 
agreement could be reached on this conflict in Geneva. Bilateral negotiations 
are to be held between the USA and the EEC to discuss the areas of conflict 
and seek ways of resolving them. 
13. At the request of the United States, the item !r!d! in_s!~i£e~ was also 
placed on the agenda of the Geneva Conference. This sector is becoming an 
increasingly important component of trade as a whole, especially between the 
industrialized countries. In the USA 75% of total employment potential is 
estimated to lie in the services sector. Services as a proportion of' exports 
have meanwhile reached 13%. In the European Community the figure lies between 
4 and 6%. 
Agreement on the inclusion of services under the GATT could not be reached in 
Geneva. The developing countries resisted this, since they feared being 
swamped by the insurance and banking system of the industrialized countries. 
'i'he only agreement that could be reached was that all states with important 
services interests could draw up a study on the problems of this sector. The 
study could serve as a basis for further consultations at the forthcoming GATT 
conference in Copenhagen. 
14. Another major item at the Geneva Conference was the procedure on 
~r~i!r~tio~ in_dis£u~e~. At present, differences of view between GATT Treaty 
partners are resolved directly by the countries concerned. Where no bilateral 
solution can be reached however, these conflicts are referred to the courts of 
arbitration set up by the GATT Council, which forward their decisionR to the 
Council. The members of the court of arbitration, who decide in their 
personal capacity, are chosen from countries that have no direct interest in 
the dispute at issue. At.the Geneva Conference, possibilities were aired that 
would give the GATT secretariat a stronger role in arbitrating on disputes. 
In particular, proposals were debated for strengthening the role of the 
Dir~ctor-General of GATT as arbitrator. A conclusive agreement on this matter 
could not, however, be reached. 
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(3) Possible arrangements 
15. The Geneva Conference has made it clear that the advantages and 
usefullness of GATT are recognized by all participants. No one seriously 
wants to return to the days of competing nations seeking self-sufficiency and 
limiting trQde to the minimum necessary, which would a.ount to a renewed 
impoverishment of world trade. On the other hand however, complete free trade 
unrestricted by any limitations or regulations, while theoretically 
conceivable, could hardly be achieved in practice. Every tariff, every 
preference, every quota, every national import regulation amounts to a 
restriction on free trade. It is therefore necessary to define free trade and 
to locate it in a social context. It is also essential, for political, 
economic and social reasons, to differentiate between necessary intervention 
and regulation of world trade, and unacceptable protectionism. It should be 
obvious from the diversity of a national economy or the scope of a customs 
union within a common market that the social cohesion brought about by freedom 
of competition and freedom in the economic process as a whole is beyond 
dispute. No one is any longer likely to come up with the idea of equating the 
market economy and freedom of trade with unregulated, unbridled economic 
liberalism, the impact of which would be devastating. 
16. To apply this to world trade, or to the world economic order and the role 
played in it by the individual states, is to realize that nothing good can 
come at world level from whatever is bad for the national economy, and 
certainly not from making the right of the stronger the exclusive standard of 
economic and trade freedom. GATT has proved its worth as a precisely 
appropriate mechanism for setting the necessary limits to freedom of trade. 
But as the Geneva Conference has made clear, GATT is not capable of operating 
as a mechanism for the satisfactory regulation of free trade in times of 
economic crisis. The step-by-step inclusion of the newly-developing 
industrial states, the so-called threshold countries, and the provision of the 
means to cope with the special situation and interests of the developing 
countries, is a task that GATT cannot fulfil in its present form. The 
objective must be to create ~ framework for free trade that takes the 
requirements of worldwide development into account and brings it into the 
ambit of the new world economic order. 
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The permissible ordering and regulation o( frpe trade must, however, be 
cLearly differentiated trom inadmi ssiblP prott>ctionism. The objective should 
.be to secure support for the concept of maintaining and developing a socially 
relevant free trade. This should include in the long term strengthening the 
resistance of the world markets to fluctuations, in for example the currency 
sector, throuah ~hat would amount to a world couju•oturll policy. A start in 
this direction might be said to have been made with the international raw 
materials agreement with its anti-cyclical orientation and a new agreement on 
the law of the sea. Where currenciea are concerned however there can be 
little expectation of an equivalent arrangement since the world monetary 
system lost the support of the Breton Woods system based on a stable dollar. 
111. Fret: trade 
(1) Definition 
17. Even the most specialized textbooks generally avoid attempting a precise 
definition of world trade. This is because the classical ideal concept of 
world trade is seldom achieved in reality. In its basic meaning, free trade 
represents a condition of perfect competition in all markets that excludes any 
interfer~nce or restrictions by the state. Trade is thus defined in terms qf 
the price mechanism of the market economy, the international division of 
labour and the theory of comparative advantage. 
Under GATT it is sought to secure free trade through the princ ipl<>s of 
most-favoured-nation treatment and reciprocity. This means that on the one 
hnnd liberalizing concessions by one part ic ipnnt operate to the advantage of 
all other participants in world trade, ancl on thE' other that relaxations on 
trade are exchanged on a basis of mutual advanta~e. 
(2) The impact on the EEC 
18. Although tre• trade is not stipulated as a specific principle of the EEC 
Treaty, the underlying objective of eliminating obstacles to trade is set out 
both in the principles (Article 3) and in the objectives of commercial policy 
(Articles 110 and 113 of the EEC Treaty). 
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The European ComtnunJ.ty' s po11cy of abohsl11ng tnternal obstacles to trade 1n 
the furtherance of thi~t ob.1ective, togetlwr with the accPlerated reduction of 
the joint customs t~:~ri(f viR-a-vis third countries, has bet!n a decisive 
contribution to the economic succeu of the Member States. It wa_s also a 
leading element in en..udn& that the Dillon, Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds of GATT 
played a decisive role in aboliRhing obstacles to trade in leadina 
industrialhad and other third countries. 
_The cooperation and association agreement concluded by the EEC with third 
countries, together with the generalized preferences scheme, can also be seen 
as helping to strengthen free trade. 
19. Despite- or perhaps more on account of - its liberal trade policies, 
~rowing problema are created for the Co111100nity in the present world economic 
critis. There ia no Community concept of trade and economic policy that can 
channel the ~rowing pr~ssure of competition trom other third countries 
reaulting from lower tariff restrictions so as to prevent healthy or vital 
branches of the COBII\mity economy trom being destroyed. The lack of any such 
mechanism ia increasingly leading individual Member States of the Coanunity to 
adopt unilateral reatrictive national meaaurea which are not only detrimental 
to the EEC as a whole but are a hindrance to any long-te~ policy to improve 
•he international division of lnhm1r. 
(l) Restrictions on free trade 
20. The social commitment• of most market economies in the leading world 
trading nntions today mean thal economic readjustment procedures resulting 
from structural change cannot be left entirely to the play of market forces. 
The elimination of capacity in tradition;d nreu of production, bankruptcies, 
and the conscquPnt ri !II' in un .. mploymt!nt unci growing dependency on importa as a 
consequt~nce of non-intervention by the state, are no longer politically 
acceptable. 
21. This means that not only should protectionism not be encouraged, but that 
trading arrangement• should be promoted to enable a continuous process of 
structural adjuatment to takf' place where necessary. Trade must continue to 
be as tree as possible, ainct! it is often only under the impetua of free 
competition that innovation and rationalization can take place. This is 
usually the only pouibiJ ity ot, 1or llXamplP, compensating for the high costs 
in the l~uropean Community rt,sult ing from the high living standards and the 
advanced levels of ll•lcinl st!curily. 
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Competition must not be restricted as soon as it begins to require structural 
change. Free trade and the attundant competition influence the size of 
undertakings and the capacity of a natl:onal economy to perform. Large markets 
clearly require performance and growth by firms. Trade restrictions constrict 
mlu·kets and have a correspondingly adverse economic i11pac=t. 
22. Increased pressure of competition has an overwhelmingly favourable impact 
on economic structure in the long term. In numerous branches of industry, 
such as the aerospace and automobile sectors, in the electronics industry and 
the steel sector, a degressive pattern of costs resulting from the size of 
undertakings is playing an increasingly important role, and the optimum size 
of undertaking is being pushed steadily upwards by technological development. 
The degressive costs pattern of the larger undertaking reduces unit costa, 
thereby increasing competitivity still further. 
It is clear therefore that import restrictions in many Third-World countries 
have impeded the development of optimum-sized undertakings and held back or 
slowed down improvements in productivity. The competitivity of these 
economies is thus partly regressive. The presence or absence of trade 
restrictions also explains for example why Hong Kong or Singapore, which have 
t.:riJh,• .-•·o.utd Lo free trade after going through a preparatory phase, have been 
able to achieve high growth rates, whereas other threshold countries like 
South Korea, Brazil and now, increasingly, Taiwan, are having to cope with 
growing difficulties. 
23. Free trade squeezes unproductive undertakings out ot the economic process 
and allows healthy firms to grow, thereby improving their productivity and, as 
a rule, creating new jobs. 
Import restrictions on the other hand can help to step up production to meet 
Jemand on the internal market that is no longer met by imports. This kind of 
growth depends principally on maintaining or reviving essentially uneconomic 
undertakings. This kind of development does not help the national economy, it 
impedes necessary structural adjustments and creates new market distortions, 
and in the longer term it jeopardizes the stability of jobs, especially those 
in undertakings where healthy development is restricted by these measures. 
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24. There is a widely held view that free trade '"' set out in the GATT 
objective• is largely a spent force. In the USA in particular the trade 
deficit with Japan on account of Japanese import practices and EBC 
agricultural exports policy, together with the lack of free competition in 
trad•• in st'!rvicua, ureo repentNIIy c i tf'd to justify thi fl view. Conaider1tt ion 
i!l IH!inK given to replacing lree trade by an-called 'fair trade'. Pair trade 
nlso include& the principle of reciprocity in trade policy measures such aa 
the· 11lructure of nnn-tclritf b11rrierH tu traclt•. There is growing presaure on 
thP Uuited States Government to take reprisals in cases where US firas do not 
have the same access to foreign markets as exports from the countries 
concerned have in the USA. 
Any such development would very quickly lead away from the multilateral 
principles of the world trade to bilateral exchanae. The great advantage of 
non-discrimination underlying multilateral trade would be lost. The volume of 
world trade would fall significantly, almost certainly in a manner that would 
adversely affect·the United States. 
lf the reciprocity principle is to be made a reality in thi a connection, it 
will require a comprehensive new compensation and sanctions mechaniaa to be 
··stnblished. A huge bureaucr11cy to scrutinize alleaed infringements of free 
trade principles would be needed. The state would need to intervene in market 
ecunom1c processes and would thereby strengthen the emerging neo-mercantalist 
trE>nd in the world economy. 1'his would mean passing the social costs of 
adjusting the economy to the requirements of a changed framework in whole or 
in part onto other countries on beggar-my-neighbour principles. The adverse 
dtecls of any such policy would not be slow in coming, and would make serious 
inroad!! into the prospE'rity of many parts of the world that depends on the 
current advanced level and high volume of world trade. 
2S. Free trade must not only be restricted in relation to structural 
requirements, but must also take account of the peculiarities of trade with 
the ,!t_!t!_-E_r_!dinl £.O~n!_rie!• The state monopoly foreign trade undertakings in 
the state-trading countries centra 1 ize all flows of aoods from Western _ 
countries • but generally have a tre-e choice of trading partner in these 
countries. Of the 1098 headingA in the Common Customs Tariff, the BIC had, by 
l97H, completely libeornlized 772, and partially liberalized 99 in favour of 
tlw Rtnte-trnding countries. 
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26. Since the responsibility for trade policy pursuant to Article 113 of the 
EEC Treaty now lies with the Com•ntmity, the last bilateral trade treaties 
between the EEC and the state-trading countries expired in 197S. Since the 
state-trading countries themselves and COMECON do not recognize the Community 
officially in international law, the situation as regards EEC trade with thi1 
group of countries is not governed by treaty. tn the inc~rim, only trade 
treaties between the EEC and Romania and China have been concluded. The EEC 
has also concluded self-limitation agreements with some COMECON states in 
particular sectors, such as textiles and steel. 
27. Since selling prices of goods produced in the state trading countries are 
determined in accordance with the economic plan and state-monopoly demand 
policy, trade with this group of countries obviously does not accord with the 
idea of free trade, and frequently requires intervention in the countries with 
free-market economies to correct the effects of dumping or other market 
distortions caused by state-trading countries. 
28. The basic idea of GATT, i.e. free trade, is conceived in terms of trade 
between countries with similar economic and social structures and 
development. The rise of ~ala~ in particular as a member of the group of 
'..•\•.1 .,tnalizt!d nations ana the emergence of former developing countries as 
so-called !hEe~h£1~ £O~n!rie! (Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, Mexico) with quite 
different structures have changed the basic framework conditions. Moreover, 
since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, world trade, as organized 
under GATT, has lost the basic element of support by a stable dollar. Of 
course, the importance of Japanese exports to the European Community should 
not be overestimated; only S% of EEC imports from third countries originates 
in Japan. Moreover, from the Japanese viewpoint the EEC comes after the USA 
(25%), the Asian countries (16%) and the OPF£ States (15%) in fourth place 
with only 11% of its external trade. This tendency is receding. 
Problems anse in particular from the fact that Japan has placed considerable 
difficulties in the way of access to markets for imports from the EEC, 
including non-tariff barriers, thereby adding considerably to the difficulty 
for European exporters of securing balanced trade. At the same time, the 
advantages of the Japanese export offensive to the European market should not 
be overlooked. These export offensives have exercised considerable pressure 
on the European economy to adapt, and have helped to bring about concentration 
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1n the iron and steel industry, .n mechanical engineering, in motor vehicle 
production, shipbuilding and the production of electrical, optical and 
electronic goods. These products taken together account for some three 
quarters of Japanese exports of industrial goods. In these sectors Japan has 
of ten made much faster and more comprehensive use of technological 
developmPnts involving structural changes than the Europeans. 
29. In this connection however the question arises as to whether the export 
offensives by Japan and other threshold countries are fully compatible with 
free trade as aimed at under GATT. For it is often the case that these 
countries take advantage of research and development work carried out in the 
industrialized countries to create production capacities in narrowly 
restricted sectors that enable them to achieve cheap assembly-line output far 
in excess of demand on their internal markets. The surpluses are aimed at 
carefully chosen markets in other industrialized countries, where the 
corresponding branches of industry are eliminated by overwhelming pressure of 
competition. 
Far from being a case of international division of labour, this is more like 
systematic international job-destruction. The walling-off of national markets 
in the threshold countries and Japan, together with massive unilateral 
enjoyment of sectoral competitive advantage, cannot be said to help in 
promoting general prosperity in accordance with the free trade objectives 
underlying GATT, and does not create opportunities for the necessary 
structural adjustments. Ways and means must be found of intervening in this 
connection. 
30. This kind of radical division of labour and structural change raises the 
question as to whether free trade does not require a more significant social 
component than hitherto,i.e. whether the subsequent development of GATT should 
not be shaped so as to take new account of the social impact of trade and the 
division of labour. 
In defining and regulating free trade, however, the cost of research.and 
development of new technologies, and the protection of intellectual property 
against exploitation should not be overlooked. 
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31. The effects of concentratioD of production by cartels and monopolies, and 
the advantages that many multinational undertakings derive from their 
production lines, should be taket1 fully into account in the further 
development of GATT and in ~he shaping of socially rel~vant free trade. The 
advantages of these forms of production and trade should be controlled, to the 
extent necessary to maintain a viable social policy, in order to protect other 
established structures that cannot be changed in the short term without being 
damaged. It will be worth considering, by analogy with the regulation of free 
trade under GATT, the development of provisions to regulate the division of 
labour and structural adjustment as a means of complementing and directing the 
basic principles of free trade. 
The manifold impact that the principle of free trade has on the structure of 
industry and commerce, the effects of unbridled trade on whole national 
economies, and thus on economic and social conditions in which nations and 
peoples live, requires, in addition to economic and structural components, as 
evaluation of the political and social impact of free trade. 
32. The simple demand for free trade and its unconditional application and 
development is only one aspect of the functions and further development of 
GATT. The political, and above all the social, aspects of free trade must be 
considered more carefully than hitherto, and allowed to operate as a limiting 
factor on the free trade concept: in other words not every measure that helps 
to regulate and control absolutely unbridled free trade is necessarily an 
unacceptable form of protectionism. 
4. Unilateral state intervention in free trade 
33. The classic form of trade manipulation is to !eyy_t!rif!s_a~d_o~h~r 
duties on imports - and less usually exports - of goods and services. These 
levies can ensure that the price of the imported goods rises until their 
competitivity on the internal market is reduced to the desired extent. This 
form of intervention 1n trade is relatively easy to apply, leaving aside the 
often difficult problem of defining the goods concerned. It is flexible and 
can therefore be readily adapted to changing economic necessities, and it 
brings in budgetary revenue to the state. Tariffs and levies are thus the 
right mechanism for compensating for dumping or other competition-distorting 
practices by exporting states. Here however a clear distinction must be made 
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between subsidies and dumping practices on the one hand and the real level of 
costs in the exporting countries on the other. Lower wages and lower social 
expenditure except where these have been artificially depressed below the 
average for the exporting country - are legitimate factors of competition by 
local export industries. That the efforts of trade unions in these countries 
to improve wages and social security should also be supported is a separate 
issue. 
34. Other mechanisms for influencing world trade include limiting quantities 
through _su2t_!S• This limits the extent of competition from imported goods. 
Pressure on domestic production can thus be kept within bounds, so that the 
latter can retain at least part of the internal market. This means however 
that pressure to bring about structural adjustment is correspondingly reduced. 
35. A special role is played by the so-called ~o~-!a~i!f_o~s!a£l~s_t~ !r_!d~. 
These include the most varied requirements to be met by the imported products, 
such as technical standards, environmental suitability, etc. They also 
include other measures by the state, such as reducing the number of customs 
posts, linquistic requirements for accompanying documents, special rules of 
origin, the requ1rement that imported goods must contain a specified amount of 
·l'"''··st ic c•Hnponents, etc. 
Restrictions of market access of this kind are playing an increasingly 
important role in the Member States and form a serious obstacle to trade. As a 
steering mechanism for socially relevant free trade they are inappropriate. 
Under the further development of GATT it will thus be urgently important to 
abolish these measures impeding trade or to expand and adapt existing rules. 
·l6. A special impact is made on trade by state subsidies or tax reliefs and 
by all forms of dumping, as defined in Article VI of GATT. 
Thus the conflict between the F.EC and the USA on tax relief granted by the USA 
to certain exporting firms has only recently been patched up. The USA has 
stated its willingness to conform its DISC system (Domestic International 
Sales Corporation) to the GATT rules. 
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The Community must be constantly on a guard against dumping practices, 
especially by threshold and state-trading countries, but also by other 
industrialized countries. The Committee on External Economic Relations has 
already reported on this problem in detail (1), stressing the importance of 
taking action against these practices to protect the EEC states as a whole 
from economic losses. 
37. A special form of intervention in free trade is artificial ~a~i£ula!i~n 
of exchange rates. Devaluation of the national currency cheapens exports and 
---~-----
makes imports more expensive, provided trading partners do not retaliate. For 
the consumer it means an increase in the price of imported goods, with the 
result that demand for them will be reduced. Devaluation can reduce pressure 
of competition from foreign producers and also increase the competitivity of 
the home export industry. This is certainly a less bureaucratic method than 
applying quotas, levying tariffs and applying other restrictions on imports, 
but in practice it means shifting the country's own economic problems onto its 
trading partners. Exchange rate alterations are only justified as a means of 
restoring balance when the national currency is wrongly valued, so as to 
restore appropriate conditions of competition. 
LL Llll' 11ational currency is devalued too steeply, moreover, the relaxation of 
pressure on the home market will only be temporary, since dearer imports will 
lead to higher price levels, so that the advantage gained from devaluation 
will ultimately be wiped out. 
The Committee on External Economic Relations hopes to draw up a special report 
on this subject. 
38. In the interests of completeness state intervention in the !e!"!.C!S 
sector should also be mentioned. This applies in particular to freight 
charges, which are often kept artificially low, by state-trading countries 
among others, thereby distorting free competition and influencing trade 
patterns. The problem of flags of convenience is also relevant here. 
(1) See Doc. 1-422/81, WELSH report on Community anti-dumping measures 
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39. Apart from the subsidies required in special cases for strategically 
important industrial structure,1, tariffs and quotas on imported goods should 
be the only mechanisms used to shape socially relevant free trade. All other 
measures are inappropriate, and should not be pursued in the further 
development of GATT, whereas in many cases GATT should further develop joint 
rules, directives and provisions on behalf of its trellty states· governing such 
matters as technical requirements for the environmental suitability of goods 
and services, etc. 
40. Safeguard measures in the form of tariff increases on new quotas should, 
however, be implemented for a fixed period and subject to uniform criteria. 
Their main objective should be to enable necessary structural adjustments to 
be made. For the Community this means that programmes with precise 
indications as to the concrete adjustment measures and social policy 
requirements should be drawn up. 
The basic guideline for such intervention should not be particular sectoral or 
group requirements but the "benefit to the economy as a whole of effective 
competition that will secure a wide-ranging supply of goods and services at 
reasonable prices and create an impetus to technical progress and innovation. 
'i. Multilateral and bilateral contractual restrictions on free trade 
41. In addition to the forms of national state intervention in trade outlinPd 
above, there exist numerous bilateral and multilaternl means of influencing_ or 
restricting trade. 
These include ~o!t=f~v~u!e~ ~a~i~n_status, preferences, trade agreements, 
coop~ration and association agreements and, increasingly in recent years, 
self-limitation agreem~nts. 
42. A central importance attaches to ~o!t=f~v~uEe~ ~a!i~n_status as set out, ~ 
in Artie le 1 of GATT, which stipulates that advantages, favoured treatment, 
privileges or concessions that a contracting party grants in respect of a good 
originating in or earmarked for another country, must immediately and 
unconditionally be granted for all comparable goods originating or earmarked 
for the territory of the other contracting parties. 
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This is not a restriction on free trade but a means of promoting it. It is 
however, as the Treaty indicates, confined to the GATT Treaty partners and 
excludes non-Members from thesP- privileges. 
43. A similar positive though limited means of promoting free trade consists 
in the granting of ~r~f~~~e! by a state or a group of states to one or more 
others. Such preference& generally include privileaad opening of the relevant 
market to product& originating in the beneficiary states. With ita general 
preferences scheme in operation since 1971 the EEC is the first group of 
industrialized countriee to comply, since the first World Trade Conference of 
1964, with reiterated calls from UNCTAD for comprehensive tariff preference• 
for developing countries. These are intended to support the efforts of these 
countries to diversify their exports. Tariff preferences have also had the 
effect of counter-balancing the disadvantages of the developing countries in 
world trade resulting from tariff structures, since products in which the 
developing countries are especially competitive have been increasingly subject 
to significantly higher tariffs than typical products of industrial countries 
since the Tokyo Round of GATT. The generalized preferences scheme has given a 
strong impetus to Third-World exporters to the EBC, but has not lived up to 
expectations of a wide-ranging impact, since it is predominantly a limited 
number of advanced developing countries, i.e. the Asean threshold countries, 
, .c~;_ .... ve derived the greatest advantage, whereas the least-developed third 
world countries have trequently fallen far short of their allotted tariff 
quotas. This unsatisfactory development has of course been taken into account 
in drawing up new projects for the generalized preferences scheme for the 
eighties, but the effectiveness of the measures taken is limited. For the 
industrial exports of the poorest countrit!S would be unlik~::ly to rise 
significantly even if tariffs were completely abolished, and in trade in 
agricultural products, where expansion is possible, the concessions made 
hitherto are insufficient. 
44. The right course of action would be to abandon the essentially defensive 
approach adopted hitherto and to develop an offensive strategy aimed at 
obtaining reciprocal concessions from the advanced developing countries with 
the objective of securing partial implementation of the GATT principle of 
reciprocity, thereby creating more and not less trade. 
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Also disruptive to trade r~lations between the EEC and the developing 
countries is the practice of conducting annual revisions of tariff preferences 
under a fixed ten-year framework. A better approach would be a long-term 
liberalization plan leading gradually to freedom from tariffs for imports from 
Third-World countries to the Community in predetertnined stages, by analogy 
with the abolition of tarifts and quantitative restrictions. This would give 
increased planning security to trading undertakings on both sides and reduce 
the risk of unproductive investment. It would also mean that different 
structures in individual EEC States could be matched by variable deadlines for 
implementation. At the same time the developing countries would also be 
required gradually to open up their markets, a process that could be varied to 
suit the different conditions prevailing in particular countries. 
45. In addition to the generalized preferences scheme. general cooperation 
agreements and sectoral trading arrangements. the £O~~r!tio~ !n~ ~S!O£i~tio~ 
~g!e~~n~s form a major component of Community external trade policy that can 
help to influence trade patterns. Mention should first be made of the 
agreement with the ACP States. which originated from the special relationships 
of some Member States of the European Comn1nity to their former colonies. and 
have been moulded into a comprehensive mechanism of EEC policy towards the 
a~ .. sl developed countries. 
The Community has further extended its trade cooperation with a number of 
countries as various as India, Yugoslavia, the Asean States and Brazil - to 
name only a few - through a series of non-preferential agreements. 
46. Less suecessful than policy vis-a-vis the poorest countries is the record 
of EEC relations with the Mediterranean countries. The global policy decided 
upon at the Paris 1-:a: Summit Conference of 1972 on relations with this group 
of countries, which led to association and cooperation agreements with Turkey, 
Malta and Cyprus. the Maghreb and Mashrek countries and Israel, has done 
little to fulfil the expectations it aroused of securing political 
stabilization in the region, consolidating the economies of the Mediterranean 
area and balanced and expanding trade between the EEC and these states. 
Moreover, the EEC has exposed itself to accusations not only from the 
non-associated developing countries, but also from other industrialized 
countries of having infringed the GATT principle of non-discrimination through 
thes~ agreements. 
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The causes of the failure of the Mediterranean policy must be sought not only 
in the lack of adequate financing, but also in the failure of the Member 
States to set clear political objectives. Many Member States are inclined to 
conduct their relations with the countries of this region bilaterally and not 
through the Community framework. It has therefore not been possible to give 
the .. objectives of cooperation and development aid a content and importance 
compatible with the values and priorities that the Community has itself 
attributed to its relations with the Mediterranean States. The Community's 
relations with the Mediterranean countries will come under very severe strain 
if a solution cannot be found to the serious difficulty that will arise when 
Spain and Portugal accede to the Community as regards the integration of these 
countries into the EEC agricultural market on terms acceptable to all 
concerned parties. 
The cooperation agreements that the Community has concluded with these 
countries are simply framework agreements that have to be completed. 
47. The gradual winding-up of trade agreements, which have hitherto been the 
predominant type of treaty in Community relations with the non-associated 
states, in favour of cooperation agreements, is a welcome development. It 
enables the various aspects of external economic relations to be brought 
'-·.)/:.~ :t,·r, thereby avoiding contradictions and making it easier for conflicts 
of interests to be resolved by mutual agreement. Since these treaties were 
concluded it is still too early to give any conclusive evaluation of this new 
method of organizing trade. 
48. The organization of free trade by way of cooperation policy moreover 
reveals a decisive defect. For the Community has still not succeeded in 
setting out a common line on negotiations on cooperation with the petroleum 
states. If the Community wishes to avoid the danger of an arbitrary, 
nationally oriented approach and thus also the danger of trade wars between 
indivual Member States, it must find its way to a uniform and conclusive 
approach. It cannot otherwise bring its economic weight fully to bear, and 
thus take better advantage of more intensive division of labour with the 
developing and threshold countries. 
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49. An even stronger possibility of influencing free trade than the foregoing 
is provided by ~e!f=l!m!t~t!o~ ~g~e~nts• This can be illustrated with the 
example of the Multifibre Arrangement. This imposes treaty restrictions on 
trade patterns in textiles in order to reduce disruption of national output ' 
and enable structures to be adapted to chang~d de .. lopments on the world 
market. But if this adaptation is not carried out, this will mean that the 
agreement has been used to maintain old undertakings that are no longer 
competitive in business, and that constantly require not only renewed 
subsidies but repeated extensions of the self-limitation agreement. 
50. There can be no doubt that an agreement to regulate world trade in 1 
textiles is currently better than an arbitary situation, which, in the present 
climate of world trade, would be bound to lead to competition in national 
protectionist measures. At all events however, the Community thould as in the 
case of the generalized tariff preferences, pursue an offensive policy aimed 
at obtaining reciprocity, rather than falling back on defensive protectionist 
measures. An essential component of this must be a persistent strategy of 
positive adjustment that places subsidies on a degressive basis subject to 
deadlines and strict and verifiable conditions. 
fJ. Protectionism and regulatory intervention in free trade 
51. In this chapter the attempt will be made to pinpoint the limits of 
intervention in trade patterns necessary to secure political, economic and 
social components against protectionism that is inadmissible under the rules 
of GATT. 
Protectionism is no new phenomenon. It was pursued under the name of 
mercantilism as deliberate economic policy in the 16th, 17th and 18th 
centuries by such countries as Spain and France, with the result that these 
countries remained economically backward, whereas states like the Netherlands, 
Britain and the USA that pursued a free-trade policy enjoyed more rapid 
economic growth. 
The forces of protectionism have recently been winning new ground. Since 
profits are shrinking and industry is having to cope with stagnant demand ~nd 
overcapacity, salvation is being sought in measures to restrict import 
competition. 
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52. The first to suffer from these measures are the most successful and 
competitive exporting countries, but they also hit developing countries that 
have become competitive in particular sectors, such as textiles. The fact that 
the developing countries are less able to buy goods from the industrialized 
countries the less the latter buy from them, has not stopped the traditional 
industrialized countries from restricting import& of te&tiles, clothing and 
electrical goods, as well as processed food stuffs from Third-World exporting 
countries. 
53. Behind all protectionist measures lies the idea of keeping the home 
industry and the home market free of troublesome competition from outside. 
Competitive capacity is thus knowingly, and often unknowingly, neglected, with 
the result that exports are sooner or later affected, both on account of 
falling competitivity and also because the protectionist measures force 
potential customers to reduce their exports with the result that their 
foreign-exchange earnings to pay for imports are reduced. 
54. Protectionist policy is often regarded as an economic policy mechanism 
for reducing unemployment. The illogicality of this protectionist outlook on 
foreign trade lies in the fact that it is one-sided in as much as it views the 
economy only from the point of view of the producer and ignores the standpoint 
of the consumer. 
Protectionism raises the prices of many goods since import competition is 
restricted or even eliminated. This adversely affects the consumer. Consumers 
are also workers in protected undertakings, although the protection is often 
illusory in that the higher incomes that the firm is able to pay because it 
can sell its output at high prices on account of protectionism, are quickly 
erroded by rising prices and growing inflation. It is the consumer at all 
events, who has to carry the burden of rising prices. 
55. Protectionism also means strengthening the bureaucracy. The latter can 
often develop a life of its own and be exceedingly difficult to bring under 
control. Lastly, protectionism does not - and is not usually intended to -
lead to firms producing under authentic free-market conditionR, and is 
therefore an obstacle to 'growth of firms in viable areas of industry. In the 
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medium te~ this will reduce arowth in incomes and jobs. 'l1le growina need for 
subsidies and rising price levels has to be covered at the expen~ of the 
consumer and tax-payer. At the same time, undertakings are aiven a reprieve 
from the need to adapt, to inaovate, to rationalize, to make ttructural 
chanaea This saves investment, and many undertekina• can hold on to their 
market• becaute they are not expoted to pretsure of co-.etition froa foreian 
rivals. Seen ln this liaht, protectioniem it not only fundamentally d .... iaa 
to national economic development, but is also anti-tocial. 
56. This may be politically desirable, and miaht even be acceptable if 
industrial oapacity is juet sufficient to supply the home market. If capacity 
is higher however, firms .uet turn to export markets, which .. ans that they 
must be able to export competitively. Their prices auat be viable on other 
countriee' aarkets. Thie eituation can be maintained as lona as the 
industrialized countriet enjoy a certain aonopoly position on the world 
market. But at more Third-WOrld countriet develop and emerae as coapetitors 
able to offer comparable product• at lower pricet, the stiffer does 
competition become for the industrialized states. The industrial sectors 
affected loose their competitivity on the world market. Thit leais to a fall 
in capacity utilization; nor does an internal market benefitin& froa 
protectionist .eatures compensate for this. The consequence• are yet hiaher 
procluct prices, and the spread of the problem to other, still coapetitive 
undertakings, since exports by the latter are depr''ssed becaute the emerging 
industrialised countries will only purchase froa states whose mart.ts provide 
outlets for their own products. 
57. Protection is nl11o used however to obstruct or dow down adjustment 
processes resulting from fair competition. This is usually justified on·the 
grounds of job creation. Sut any trade policy that put non-adjustment at a 
premium would be bound to entail unacceptably high overall econo.ic costs. 
The most that can be justified is provisional channelling of excessive 
pressure to adjust. Trade policy and structural policy measures ean be 
envisaged subject to this condition. Structural policy measure• should be 
aimed primarily at strengthenin& capacity to adjust, whereas trade policy 
should be used to forestall short-term dittortioftl in the adjustaent process 
by external economic influences. 
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58. Since protectionism distorts the structures of consumption, production 
and external trade, reduces overall economic prosperity· and narrowly restricts 
the margin of growth of the economy, it should manifestly be the exception 
rather than the rule. This also applies not least on aecount of the threat to 
exports of counter measures. 
Experience shows that it is ~lways difficult, even if only in the short term, 
to reverse protectionist measures once they have been authorized. The more 
likely development is that they will not only be retained,, but further 
strengthened. Nor should protectionist measures be allo~d to be interpreted 
as an indication that the state has assumed responsibility for securing jobs, 
and that significant private initiatives have been made superfluous. 
Governments all too often tend to regard trade policy measures aa a substitute 
for - and not as an adjunct to - structural policy measures. 
59. The principle must therefore be adhered to of ensuring that specific and 
highly restrictive conditions are attached to measures designed to afford 
protection against exte~al economic activity. This means that protectionist 
measures should be regularly authorized only on the basis of precisely ftled 
deadlines, and ·only as part of a comprehensive public and private sector 
:•dj•u;Ln··~•" pro&rammc. kt>gular controlH 11111:-.t: also be used to ensure that the 
sector concerned reacts by implementing appropriate adjustment measures, and 
is not allowed to default on this, as has occurred with for example the world 
textiles agreement. This also means that the scope of t'he measures 
implemented should as a rule be degressive. This would also go a long way 
towards relaxing the tension frequently associated with new temporary 
measures. Protection against precipitate structural adjustment for a fixed 
time period is at all events to be welcomed, in particular in times of 
economic recession and crisis, as a socially necessary restriction on free 
trade. All structural adjustment entails job losses. In 'normal' times these 
losses are balanced out by the creation of new jobs elsewhere, ie. in sectors 
that benefit from structural adjustment or that belong t~ areas with a strong 
capacity for innovation. The objective of this kind of protectionist measure 
however must always be to complete the necessary structutal adjustment and not 
to maintain outdated structures that are no longer competitive. 
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60. Protectionism can also be justified as a means of securing a basic level 
of equipment and supplies in particular goods. Thus in the European 
Community, the priority given to covering food-supply requirements is one of 
the fundamental objectives of agricultural policy. The same also applies to 
raw materials and industrial products, and to services where overwhelming or 
complete dependence on third-country suppliers should be avoided. One example 
of this is the field of energy supplies and thus the securing of a certain 
independence of supplies originating in third countries in important raw 
materials. Without protectionist measures to maintain domestic energy 
sources, hard-coal mining in the 70s would, for example, have succumbed more ,, 
or less completely to competition from cheap oil in the 70s. The European 
Community would have become economically and politically overwhelmingly 
dependent on energy imports and thus open to blackmail. 
61. The need to maintan certain basic structures is another socio-political 
component of free trade. This applies for example to the shipbuilding 
industry. The European Community must not neglect to maintain a certain 
shipbuilding capacity. External trade is a fundamental element for economic 
stability in the European Community, and this in turn depends fundamentally on 
an efficient sea-transport system and a modern highcapacity merchant fleet. 
62. In the strategically important sectors, also, in particular those of 
security and defence, intervention in free trade must be permitted. This 
applies both to maintaining production capacities and to restricting exports 
for political reasons. 
These restrictions on free trade should however be kept within clearly defined 
limits, for the close integration of the Community in world trade and the 
strongly regional distribution of suppliers mean that the argument from 
security of supplies is generally only of limited economic justification. The 
subsidies necessary to protect such areas of industry from external 
competition can hardly ever be justified by comparison with the possible risks 
or with the extent and duration of probable interruptions in supplies. 
IV. Adjustment of EEC policies to regulated free trade within GATT 
63. The countries of the European Community account for about SO% of each 
WP 0350E 
OR.DE. 
- 40- PE83.551/f' 1n. 
other's external trade. A further 25% of external trade is with 
industrialized third countries, in particular the USA and Japan. Changes in 
the volume and structure of this trade have led to relatively minor lahour 
market problems. 
Trade with Japan has however led to redirection towards certain specialized 
markets. It is above all the emergence of the threshold countries however, 
with their less skilled labour forces and relatively undemanding technologies 
in traditional areas of production that has placed the greatest pressure on 
the old industrialized countries and produced considerable pressure for 
labour-market adjustments in the EEC as elsewhere. These countries have of 
course also strongly increased their purchases from the EEC, but those made 
redundant in one branch of production are not necessarily qualified for 
immediate employment in another, expanding branch. 
64. Since the 70s this change in world and domestic economic conditions has 
created a growing need for structural adjustment. The preparedness and 
capacity of industrial undertakings for adjustment has not however been 
adequate to the task in hand. This failure to secure adequate levels of 
structural adjustment has contributed to lower growth and employment rates. 
i nder conditions ·'1f f:-ee tradtl, adjustment of supply structures of the EEC 
economy to changed international relations of competition will require 
concentration on high-technology goods, further specialization of production 
and a willingneRE to abandon areas of production that are no longer 
competitiw. Thi~> wj I I in turn depend on raising productivity through 
increased investments, a more intensive research and development effort and 
increasing the skillls of the labour force. 
65. These considerations make it clear that a close connection exists between 
EEC trade policy and emerging EEC structural policy in the fields of 
agricultural, social and regional policy and in energy and industrial 
policy. Protectionist trade policy and structural policy aimed at 
maintaining sectoral distribution of production and employment can only reduce 
opportunities for shaping viable structures in terms of international 
competition and securing growing rea~ incomes through higher productivity. An 
effective free trade policy in the Epropean Community must be supported by a 
development and industrial policy a(. CollllllJnity level. 
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66. Th~ objective of a conunon industry policy IIIUSt be to help bring aboui'';a 
constructive division of labour. The industrialized countries must use this 
division of labour to the advantage of their high-value technology, the 
developing countries to that of their lower costs. It would be absurd to he 
afraid uf a rile in productivity. In the long term the classical labour 
supply in moat induatrialized states is approaChin& loftl•te~ exhaustion on 
demographic grounds alone, and this can only be offaet by increaaed 
productivity. 
''· 
67. Nor can world poverty be finally overcome except throu&h a continuation 
of the development procesa, although here development cannot be a simple copy 
of that in industrialized statea with their particular social structures, but 
must be built on the existing atructures that have grown up among the peoplea 
concerned. Only in this way can the repeated tendency of more development to 
mean more social upheaval, hunger and poverty be reverted, and development 
become a force to overcome hunger and poverty while atabilizing and 
consolidatin& existing social structurea. u 
68. The developing countries remain major raw materials suppliers to the 
Community. In a departure from the now out-dated pattern of North-South trade 
l•'l.i!ions- raw material.o; again~>t tinished products- they are also 
increasingly emerging as participants in a substitution process as a 
consequence of the national division of labour. They are increalinaly tnding 
finished goods aaainst finished goods. The developing countries are for 
example supplying consumer goods in exchange for inwatraent goods that are 
inve&tl•d inter alia in thE> consumer goods industries, thereby strengthening 
the international competitivity of these branches of industry or indeed making 
it possible for the first time. 
69. As a consequenc~ of these developments the non-traditional exports of the 
developing countries have become the focal point of external trade conflicts 
between the Community and the Third-World states, for the developing countries 
are demanding not only tarift-free and unrestricted access to Caa.unity 
markets, but also tend to grant their export industries massive state 
subsidies of the most varied kinds. The COIIIIIIUnity ttates 1 for their part, 
recognize the needs of the developing countriea for free access to markets at 
least in principle, 
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insofar as these accord with the liberalization objectives of the EEC treaty. 
Yet the credibility of Community and Member-State development policy is at 
stake in that it has repeatedly and explicitly urged Third-World countries to 
adopt a strategy of world market integration and export-oriented 
industrialization as a means of making a greater development impact than a 
public transfer of resources that could not be impleaented as intended, either 
quantatively or qualitatively. 
70. Nor is it so much the absolute levels and current dimensions of processed 
goods imported from the Third World that is cause for concern, but rather the 
high growth rates of trade in such goods and the attendant prospects for 
future development. The distrubing fact is that those hardest hit by 
competition from developing countries tend to be in the less skilled jobs in 
crisis regions and to have little chance of finding a new job, and there is a 
follow-on effect on those branches of industry that in any event face strong 
pressure of competition from abroad and are also placed at a disadvantage by 
general changes in patterns of demand as a consequence of changing income 
structures. 
71. The EEC states also deplore the lack of balance in their trade relations 
with the developing countries and in particular those with the threshold 
countries. The latter tend to maintain the high protectionist barriers with 
which they protect local suppliers against foreign competition even when the 
• domestic branches of industry have grown out of the development stqe and have 
demonstrated their international competitivity by achieving impressive export 
successes in conditions of relatively free access to markets in the 
industrialized countries. 
72. A further objective of Community industrial policy must be to put an end 
to national protectionist policies. The necessary structural adjustment 
process must be strengthened by joint tariff and fiscal policy measures. This 
is also necessary in order to be able to influence the market so as to 
regulate the rate of necessary structural change as a way of avoiding or 
compensating for an adverse social impact. 
No such structural adjustment policy would be complete without consideration 
and analysis of world market developments. This would allow data to be 
assembled in good time so as to,/enable sectors affected by these developments 
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to implement an adjustment strategy as early as possible. This kind of 
preventive structural policy would require representation of the European 
Community in the Third World to be expanded as the only way of conducting the 
necessary in-depth monitoring and analysis of economic developments in these 
states. 
73. It will alto be necessary to strengthen the ~olition of the Commission as 
regards Community industrial policy so as ultimately to secure a common 
structural policy as opposed to ten often highly divergent structural 
policies. Among other things this would mean harmonizing Community 
legislation on cartels, trade, companies and competition. The Community will 
not otherwise be in a long-term position to take full advantage of the 
opportunities open to it under GATT and to protect itself not only against 
dumping practices but also against cartels, in particular those of large 
international undertakings, thereby securing· uninterrupted development of its 
own industrial structures and guarantees of jobs in the Community. 
74. European structural policy must include development of a negotiating 
mechanism aimed in particular at enabling small and medium-sized undertakings 
to secure new markets, build up a clientele and carry out necessary product 
servicing. Implementation of structural promotion measures, insofar as the 
inll iative is taken by the Member States,. must be coordinated by the 
Commission to avoid competition in the granting of adjustment subsidies. In 
the medium term this will make consistent fiscal harmonization necessary, 
together with the development of a 'know-how exchange', risk-capital 
arrangement and joint planning of expansion and consolidation. Special 
importance will attach to expansion of European regional aid, for joint 
coordinated structural adjustment must be given priority and be concentrated 
above all on the weaker regions of the Community. 
75. One of the reasons for the Japanese export success was and remains 
Japan's capacity to produce industrial products for export in very large 
quantities and therefore at highly favourable costs. In Europe many branches 
of industry are conceived on much too small a scale, to be able to produce at 
such low costs. Here, the objective must be to promote the step-by-step 
establishment of a joint European industrial structure as opposed to making 
repeated additions to numerous existing national structures. It is 
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unacceptable for trans-frontier cooperation between undertakings to be subject 
to repeated failures on account of continuing discrepancies in national 
legislation concerning taxation, social security and the constitution of 
companies. 
76. If a European industrial policy is to succeed and to help s~cure the 
competitivity of European industry and maintain jobl, together with high 
living standards and high real incomes, it must be supplemented by a common 
external trade policy. Although a common external trade policy should, to 
comply with the EEC Treaty, have long since been in existence, the fact is 
that it has only been achieved in part. 
11. It is a valid principle that the answer to the challenge of world 
economic structural change - necessary and inevitable as it is can only take 
the form of a positive, forward-looking strategy of adjustment and not that of 
an attempt to preserve outdated structures. Close connections do in fact 
exist between external trade, structural change and economic gtowth. The 
decisive factors for structural change, in addition to the rate of economic 
gtowth, are redirection of public and private demand and the introduction of 
new production procedures and new goods, together ~ith agricultural policy 
measures. 
Given the high level of the Community's external trade interpenetration, a 
close interrelationship between structural change, economic growth and 
external trade must be expected. Exports as a percentage of Community 
industrial production rose from 20% to over 25% in the 70s, and the import 
rate rose from 18% to 23%. For some smaller Member States these rates were 
even higher. 
78. External trade interpretation is both a cause and an effect of internal 
economic structural change in the Community. Change in production and 
employment structures is influenced by changes in the level and structure of 
world demand. Changes in the volume of world trade and in internationally 
divergent economic cycles can result in wide variations in gtowth of demand 
for Community goods. Supply changes in competitor countries on EEC or 
third-country markets can also b/ responsible for structural changes. New 
product development and the est/blishment of new industries abroad offering 
attractive quality and prices ~~ Community purchasers will force European 
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producers to make timely adjustments, i.e. either to implement their own 
product and production innovations or to give up production or transfei'·J.: Eo 
other locations where costs are lower. In this connection, technology 
Lrans[ers are l.wund to assume major importance. De liveries of European 
investment goods, transfers of patents and licences, and Community direct 
investments would h~lp to accelerate these processes. For European operators 
to forego such commitments would scarcely alleviate the negative impact within 
the Community, for it could only be expected that in that event the place of 
European suppliers or investors of capital would be taken by und~rtakings from 
other industrialized countries. I 
79. There can be no doubt that exports of technology save the recipient 
countries arduous and often costly development efforts, and in conjunction 
with low-cost conditions of production give them an initial advantage 
vis-a-vis the exporting countries, but in the medium term these advantages can 
only be maintained and exploited if their own research and development efforts 
lead to new product and production developments. It should also be noted 
that, particularly in times of reduced growth in real incomes, a shifting 
pattern of inten:al demand is likely. Producers are therefore more strongly 
impelled to take measures to maintain and increase their international 
competitivity if they wish to avoid production and job losses. 
V. GATT adjustment - the necessary steps 
80. The foregoing •.11ill have shown the necessity of decisive promotion of 
Third-World devt~loomf!nt. This must include stricter observation of articles ~....:...::...._....:...:;_ .. ______ _.._ __ 
XXXV I to XXXV Ill of GATT and more comprehensive implementation of the 
agreements they contain, including: 
- improv€ments tn f'xporr earnings 
-- improvements in access to markets 
- st renglhening of divers ificat i.on efforts 
- s treng':hening of financial aid, etc., 
for the developing countries. 
81. Where efforts to ~romote the developing countries under GATT are stepped 
up, attention must be paid to the need for the developing countries to be 
bound under GATT rules to the extent that their development has led to an 
incre~se in their competitivity. 
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82. The fuller development and adjustment of GATT and the redefinition of its 
fundamental principle of free trade will require the following Rdditional 
developments: 
- further aboliton of non-tariff barriers to trade; 
- a clearer d~finition and understanding of sublidi•a; 
- the creation of clear criteria for the restriction of self-limitation 
agreements to fixed time periods and exceptional circumstances; 
- inclusion of services under GATT rules, having special regard to the 
interests of developing countries; 
introduction of an improved arbitration procedure by strengthening the 
authority of the GATT secretariat and introduction of means of imposing 
sanctions; 
- the calling of a special GATT round on trade problems of the developing 
countries. 
The most difficult task for GATT however will be the search for a satisfactory 
definition of necessary protectionist measures so as to ensure that they allow 
the fundamental principle of free trade to be maintained to the greatest 
extent possible, while providing for the continuing adjustment of economic 
<;I t•.H:tures, with due regard to national economic conditions in the Member 
States of GATT and the need to secure more jobs and a fair division of labour. 
..._ ......... 
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